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REPORT

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PLACE ACQUIRED

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

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1. The atomic warfare manuals [] were received at the 287th Rifle Regiment in November 1953; their arrival was followed by an urgent order of the commanding general of the 95th Rifle Division for all officers of the regiment to familiarize themselves with the contents of the manuals so that they would be able to train their subordinate EM during the winter training period, 1953-54. 25X1

2. Officers were urged to study available atomic warfare manuals in the Regimental Secret Documents Section [] 25X1

[] as in the case of all other secret and top secret manuals, the Secret Documents Section kept a record of which officers had studied the atomic warfare manuals and how much time they had spent studying. 25X1

[] at one of the regimental officers' roll calls at headquarters, the Regimental Chief of Staff, Major SKIBITSKIY, rebuked some officers who had devoted very little or no time to the study of the atomic warfare manuals. 25X1

3. [] lecture, held at the beginning of December 1953, which was given to regimental officers on atomic warfare and atomic energy by the Regimental Medical Officer, Major PAL'CHIKOV. 25X1

[] In this lecture Major PAL'CHIKOV gave [] definition of an atom and its components. He talked about electrons and protons. [] mentioned single atoms and complex atoms (prostyye i slozhnyye). 25X1
[] the single one, given as an example by him, was the

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hydrogen atom which had one positive proton as a nucleus and two negative electrons on its outer shell. He drew a sketch of the hydrogen atom on a blackboard in the following way:




Fig. 1

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4. Shortly after the lecture officers' training was initiated. It consisted of group study which was organized within battalions. This was organized by the CO of the battalion who usually read certain chapters of top secret atomic warfare manuals to his subordinate officers. [redacted] during December there were three or four such group study sessions, each of which lasted three to four hours. [redacted] the intention was to discuss the material with officers and to check to what extent they understood and had memorized the material presented. The organization of these group studies was poor, however, and everybody considered them as being a routine matter, simply an order with which they had to comply but nothing more. The group study usually began with the battalion CO reading some material from a manual and then requesting one of the company commanding officers to take over and continue the study. The battalion commanding officer then left the group. As soon as he left the officer in charge started to make cracks about atomic warfare and atomic weapons and this was usually followed by conversation on unrelated subjects. [redacted] the intention was to request all officers to submit written compilations on atomic warfare material presented in the group studies. This was supposed to be in the form of a written examination; however, this was never done. 25X1

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5. [redacted] sometime at the end of December an examination commission was sent from the group headquarters to the 95th Guards Rifle Division. [redacted] the results of the examinations conducted were considered to be very poor. Several times in January some examining officers were sent from the divisional headquarters to my regiment. These officers spent most of their time in the regimental headquarters. [redacted] Officers [redacted] were not required to devote any specific amount of time to the study of the atomic warfare manuals but the importance of the study was stressed continually. 25X1
6. In January 1954, lectures on atomic warfare were initiated for the EM of my regiment. These lectures were organized within platoons; the platoon leaders read chapters in the Soldiers' and Sergeants' Atomic Defense Handbook and explained the contents to the EM. Sometimes the whole company would attend such a lecture given by a platoon leader. Sometimes the platoon leader in charge would give the handbook to an NCO to replace him as lecturer. The latter procedure, of course, was against regulations; but since interest was very low and supervision over lectures given to EM was insufficient if any, this happened on several occasions. These lectures to EM were given in two-hour periods twice weekly, i.e. four hours weekly, amounting to a total of 16 hours through January 1954; at the end of that time the material was supposed to have been sufficiently covered. Individual soldiers were not required to study the Soldiers' and Sergeants' Atomic Defense Handbook; they were not authorized to get it from the company strong box upon a signed receipt. This meant that a soldier was not able to have this handbook in his hands unless the NCO, who had taken it upon receipt, gave it to the soldier for a few minutes in order to read a paragraph or to clarify some misunderstanding during the study hour. During the same period as the lectures to the EM, company commanding officers were supposed to give lectures on the Soldiers' and Sergeants' Atomic Defense Handbook to company NCO's. Two or three lectures of two hours each were scheduled weekly. Some were not given, and NCO's attended the soldiers' lectures instead. The NCO's lectures, as well as those for the soldiers, were poorly organized; the lecturers did not know the material sufficiently and did not show any interest. Examinations given by the lecturers showed that the EM had even less interest than their lecturers and all it amounted to was compliance with an order by superiors. Furthermore, there were many soldiers belonging to various national minorities in my regiment. (At one period my platoon, which had an actual T/O of 14 soldiers, was composed of men of six different nationalities.) These people could hardly understand what the lectures were all about. Results, therefore, were very poor.
7. During January 1954, there was also scheduled practical training for EM on atomic warfare deactivization and medical treatment. However the regimental barracks were overcrowded and there were not enough classrooms available. Outside it was too cold and so this training was never carried through. Instead, deactivization and medical treatment were explained and demonstrated during the lectures held on the Soldiers' and Sergeants' Atomic Defense Handbook.
8. In January 1954, when the EM's training started, the training plan chart posted in regimental units' barracks, contained, among other subjects, "Atomic Warfare Defense". However, the chart never specified what kind of training was to be carried out, but had, instead, only notations of the following type: "Training #1; Training #3; etc."

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In the Regimental Secret Documents Section there was in addition to the atomic warfare manuals [redacted], a secret pamphlet entitled, Atomic Defense Training Program (Programma: zashchita ot atomnogo oruzhiya), published by the Defense Ministry in Moscow. This pamphlet gave exact contents of each training program; for instance:

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Training #1 - Description of Atomic Weapons,

Training #4 or #5 - Deactivization and Medical Treatment,

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Training #(?) - Protective Measures at Deactivation,

Training #(?) - Crossing of Contaminated Areas.

9. In December 1953 or January 1954, an order was issued at my regiment stating that every company in the regiment had to organize, for the winter period, a section of chemical defense (otdeleniye khimicheskoy zashchity), composed of one sergeant and four privates. For one week these people were relieved of all duties and training within their companies and were dispatched every morning to the regimental chemical warfare officer for chemical warfare and atomic warfare defense training in decontamination of weapons, equipment, clothing, as well as medical treatment.

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[redacted] these people returned to their company barracks only in the evening and resumed their special training the next morning.

10. [redacted] no specialized officers for atomic warfare had been assigned to combat units or staffs of the Soviet Army [redacted] at this early stage the chemical warfare officers in troop units and staffs were being used to carry out the atomic warfare defense program. Since they were not qualified in atomic warfare and since the manuals stated that these tasks were to be given to specially trained personnel, it would be reasonable to assume that as soon as trained personnel were available they would be dispatched to the troop units and relieve the chemical warfare officers who were the best available to do the job.

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11. In February 1954 the platoon level practical training with EM on atomic defense manuals started. Soldiers were instructed in deactivating personal weapons and equipment, and personal medical treatment (RC-2169). Three or four instructions for two hours each were given on this subject. Atomic warfare tactics were combined and taught with infantry tactics and fortification. Regarding atomic warfare defense tactics, special stress was placed on making the soldiers realize that fast, efficient, and deep entrenching is the best protection against atomic warfare casualties. However, due to the very cold weather in February 1954, deeply frozen (more than one meter deep) ground, and shortage of other than the small sized personal entrenching tools [redacted] not even succeed in preparing a sample of an atomic warfare trench. All the soldiers could do was to dig 10 - 15 cm. deep in three hours. Emphasis was also placed on the use of chemical warfare protective clothing and the gas masks which were mentioned as fairly good protection against combat radioactive means and radioactive rays. The faster the clothing and gas mask were donned, the faster soldiers could take cover or just by lying on the ground face down, the more protection they could expect to have against effects of atomic warfare.

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12. The problem usually stated that the enemy was expected to use atomic weapons (davalas' vvodnaya chto protivnik veroyatno gotovitsya primenit' atomnoye oruzhiye). When this notice was given, soldiers had to don chemical warfare protective clothing and gas masks and continue the problem. Results were considered satisfactory when the entire chemical warfare protective equipment (gas masks, stockings, cape, gloves) was donned in two minutes. After a certain time the officer conducting the training would give the command "atomic explosion" ("atomnyy vzryv"). Upon this command soldiers had to take cover without delay, if possible in the immediate vicinity (no further away than two or three steps), if no cover was available they simply lay face down on the ground. When the danger was presumably over the officer would give the command "all clear" ("otboy") and order the men to perform limited deactivation of weapons and equipment and personal medical treatment. However, since soldiers did not have any material with which to deactivate (soldiers of my regiment were not even issued the chemical warfare protective kits) and there was no water available, nothing was done on receipt of this order. This means that the soldiers just got up, left cover, and upon the given command continued to carry on the original problem which was usually a march to the enemy and attack. Actually, according to the provisions of the manual, after the command "all clear", the officer in charge had to take his unit away from the contaminated area, perform limited deactivation and medical treatment, and then either continue the original problem or start a new one, according to the tactical situation. This and similar training partly on platoon, and partly on company level, was conducted for about three weeks in February 1954, approximately three to four hours weekly.
13. On or about 18 February 1954 there was a battalion training organized in my regiment. The entire 2nd Battalion participated in it. On the day of training the battalion was alerted at 0430 hours and went to formation with full combat equipment except for live ammunition. Deputy Regimental Commanding Officer, Colonel BASHKIR, was in charge of the exercise. The problem called for a forced march toward the enemy in the direction of Reichenau (coordinates not available). The enemy was supposedly deploying his troops about 35 km. from Urfahr with the obvious aim of attacking our forces. After the problem was given, the battalion was loaded on trucks and proceeded toward the enemy. Several trucks at the head of the column soon got stuck in the snow and the battalion continued on foot. [redacted] two or three 25X1 miles and then the notice was given by Colonel BASHKIR that the enemy was preparing to use atomic weapons. The battalion discontinued the march and soldiers were given a command to don gas masks and chemical warfare protective clothing. It took approximately three minutes to do so after which the battalion continued the march. [redacted] marched for 25X1 two more miles and then the command "atomic explosion" was given. Soldiers took cover or threw themselves on the ground. After five minutes the command "all clear" was given, followed by the order to perform the limited deactivation and medical treatment. Here again, no material for this purpose was available and therefore nothing was done on receipt of this order. Eventually the command to take off chemical warfare protective equipment was given and the march was continued. [redacted] two or three more miles, took attacking 25X1 position, attacked the imaginary enemy (represented by one platoon of the 7th Company of our regiment) and defeated them. The same day, around 1700 hours, the battalion returned to the barracks. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] Results achieved in this exercise were poor because no deactivation means were available and the exercise was not taken seriously by the participants. Similar exercises on company or battalion level were carried on on several Sundays at the end of January and through February 1954. Usually one company or battalion received a problem consisting of approximately 15 km. forced march on foot with the final phase, deployment against an attacking or defending enemy under atomic warfare conditions. Usually the exercise was conducted in the direction of Galnoekirchen (?), about 15 km. from Auhof.

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14. On or about 9 February 1954 there was a divisional (95th Rifle Division) exercise. At one of the regimental officers' roll calls held prior to this exercise, we were informed by our regimental CO that a special commission had been sent from the General Staff of the Armed Forces in Moscow to Austria in order to ascertain the results of atomic warfare training at the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Austria. The head of this commission was allegedly Marshal of the Soviet Union GOVOROV. It was mentioned that in the fall of 1953 a large-scale atomic warfare maneuver was held in the Carpathian Military District, USSR, supervised by the same or a similar commission, and now the time had come to check on the atomic warfare preparedness of the Soviet troops in Austria. The Regimental CO, Colonel CHERNYSHEVICH, informed us that Marshal GOVOROV was expected to inspect our regiment in the immediate future, and gave us instructions in preparation for receiving this high-ranking visitor. However, Marshal GOVOROV never appeared to inspect my regiment. A general staff commission from Moscow came to inspect the 95th Rifle Division at St. Poelten.

An atomic warfare exercise was organized on this occasion, around 9 February 1954, in the Allensteig ^N 48-41, E 15-187 area which was a large training area and artillery range for the Central Group of Forces. The 284th Rifle Regiment, one T & SP regiment, two artillery regiments and the 3rd Battalion of the 287th Rifle Regiment, all belonging to the 95th Rifle Division, participated. I do not know the designation of the T & SP or the two artillery regiments of the 95th Rifle Division. The problem for the 3rd Battalion, 287th Regiment, which was supposed to represent the enemy, called for transportation under atomic warfare conditions to the Allensteig region and then defense against the attacking enemy which was using atomic weapons.

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the exercise turned out to be a complete failure. The troops reached the area after a delay of as much as 10 hours (especially the 284th Rifle Regiment, the main unit participating in the exercise) and with much of its mechanized equipment left behind or lost on the way because of the frost and heavy snow. After a long delay, the attacking column of the 284th Rifle Regiment, riding on trucks, approached the entrenched 3rd Battalion of the 287th Regiment and was met with the deadly fire of the defenders. Except for those on the first truck, the soldiers of the attacking column did not even bother to get off the trucks. The entire exercise actually amounted to the action of about 20 soldiers on the attackers' side who got off the first truck and went toward the enemy (3rd Battalion) shouting "Hurrah". The 3rd Battalion of the 287th Regiment also began shouting "Hurrah", following which the exercise was discontinued. The supply situation during the exercise was completely disorganized, the field kitchens were lost on the way, and the soldiers were left for 36 hours with practically no food. No iron ration (NZ) which could be used in such an emergency was issued to troops during maneuvers. Several days after the exercise

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there was another officers' roll call in the regimental headquarters during which the regimental CO informed that the atomic warfare exercise held on 9 February 1954 at the 95th Rifle Division had been performed in a very poor way and that the division had received an unsatisfactory rating from the inspecting commission from Moscow. No subsequent atomic warfare exercises were planned for the time being on the divisional level and were informed that the atomic warfare exercises would be carried out on a lower level within the 287th Rifle Regiment. Therefore the 2nd Battalion had the exercise conducted on 18 February 1954 described above (paragraph 13). After the failure of the 95th Division atomic warfare exercise there was no more talk of Marshal GOVOROV visiting the 287th Regiment.

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15. At the same time preparations were carried on for the 287th Regiment atomic warfare exercise which was scheduled to be held on 8 March 1954 in Allensteig area. Soldiers were issued replacements for missing equipment, blank ammunition, canteen-caps, spoons, etc., and a great deal of time was spent in company and Komsomol organizational meetings; the main topic under consideration was that the coming exercise was a challenge to the 287th Rifle Regiment, and the regimental Party and Komsomol organizations. The training for this exercise did not include anything new, however, and the regiment, was not prepared for the exercise.

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